It's a hard problem, and devs work toward solutions as they ...

liminal 🦠

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Kind-1 (TextNote)

2026-06-06T12:08:23Z

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419cbcbdd561336cf7b0e01f7a9fefd0e65d5878934684ac81d03170ef995277...

It's a hard problem, and devs work toward solutions as they can. But again, it's a hard problem, so those solutions take time.

But in terms of scope - it's a global/macro/open system problem. Just like you don't care to access every website on the internet, you don't care to connect to every relay. You care for a select few, and generally trusted set of relays.

The sharpest answer to this problem that doesn't answer global scope is two sided. (1) Devs surface relays that are generally trustable (like a search engine aims to surface generally trustable websites), they can even offer - as I mentioned earlier - hard coded relays. (2) Users choose their relays, leave relays that don't meet the user's standards, associate with other users to advocate for good relays, warn for problematic content, warn for relays that don't manage themselves.

There are some ways to formalize this. Relay reviews, events that use a sort of "gossip propagation" passing information about trusted and malicious relays, but that's a collective action problem.

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