This in particular...

tigs

npub1q7why7lw8kq9ufr43ps75ngz3vhx5duqt7xmgklcq3dljqqfjegq2km2vr

hex

47c1f668d5af54dc4fd213e173956066e13df46be048557215b7888a887e0b2d

nevent

nevent1qqsy0s0kdr2674xuflfp8ctnj4sxdcfa7347qjz4wg2m0zy23plqktgprpmhxue69uhhyetvv9ujuem4d36kwatvw5hx6mm9qgsq08tj00hrmqz7y36csc02f5pgktn2x7q9lrd5t0uqgkleqqyev5q08hu6l

Kind-1 (TextNote)

2026-04-19T02:43:34Z

↳ 回复 tigs (npub1q7why7lw8kq9ufr43ps75ngz3vhx5duqt7xmgklcq3dljqqfjegq2km2vr)

Just wondering if you covered any of this? https://gist.github.com/ttiiggss/e8a1bc5dc326e66b202ae08955bfeb19 Ty!

This in particular...

For a public, permissionless mesh (anyone can join) — not yet. The four critical/high items (root hijacking, ancestry spoofing, bloom poisoning, discovery flooding) all assume a malicious node inside the mesh. In a permissionless network, that's guaranteed. The protocol needs:

Root election with cost — proof-of-work, minimum age, or stake
Per-entry ancestry signatures — already on their roadmap
Bloom filter validation — reject suspiciously dense filters
Per-source LookupRequest rate limiting — cap flood generation

原始 JSON

{
  "kind": 1,
  "id": "47c1f668d5af54dc4fd213e173956066e13df46be048557215b7888a887e0b2d",
  "pubkey": "079d727bee3d805e24758861ea4d028b2e6a37805f8db45bf8045bf900099650",
  "created_at": 1776566614,
  "tags": [
    [
      "e",
      "28f7276c16e39f38263823076f4d5ec2e33f8533b67c6ae4a93b1e2f729b5151",
      "wss://relay.primal.net/",
      "root",
      "056f33245ca4cc4fa3c1d6e557dd8eae714889f3c3423cbd6fbf09f3c0e200d2"
    ],
    [
      "e",
      "c359304bee11654647043cf34a6c60710128c06c2fc6b367d6c8204bc02554a4",
      "wss://relay.0xchat.com/",
      "reply",
      "079d727bee3d805e24758861ea4d028b2e6a37805f8db45bf8045bf900099650"
    ],
    [
      "p",
      "83d999a148625c3d2bb819af3064c0f6a12d7da88f68b2c69221f3a746171d19"
    ],
    [
      "p",
      "1096f6be0a4d7f0ecc2df4ed2c8683f143efc81eeba3ece6daadd2fca74c7ecc"
    ],
    [
      "p",
      "23d12ef8751e5ee267fb6341d7c41b9434a1b99869e0212eb34d56abb6b12e8a"
    ],
    [
      "p",
      "056f33245ca4cc4fa3c1d6e557dd8eae714889f3c3423cbd6fbf09f3c0e200d2"
    ]
  ],
  "content": "This in particular...\n\nFor a public, permissionless mesh (anyone can join) — not yet. The four critical/high items (root hijacking, ancestry spoofing, bloom poisoning, discovery flooding) all assume a malicious node inside the mesh. In a permissionless network, that's guaranteed. The protocol needs:\n\n    Root election with cost — proof-of-work, minimum age, or stake\n    Per-entry ancestry signatures — already on their roadmap\n    Bloom filter validation — reject suspiciously dense filters\n    Per-source LookupRequest rate limiting — cap flood generation",
  "sig": "a6d039d5cd97450e3294fe4c36e439dab3a90a4919dd098e58a3e6519225fddbdb5552213aadcfc098955dfa12017b075d446671d103f38be60d207ca11e1d70"
}