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Do not allow the colors and brightness on your mobile device to be more vivid than the world around you that God created. 📱🌲🐦🌞 #SovereignStack #ToChristAlone

It is surprising that the radio entropy source was poorly understood and implemented by their devs. Grateful they ported Core's accumulative entropy approach, so that no single entropy source could collapse the entropy pool. Protects against mishaps like this, which are easier to make and trickier to verify than one would think. There is narrow case that needs to be researched by Blockstream: a Jade Classic on No-Radio firmware from the fast-fill era (around 1.0.40) generating a seed before useful host entropy arrived, and the boot camera plus sensors added little beyond that short HWRNG dump. Probability low of compromised seeds in my sense of things, but if I were relying on 1.0.40 seeds I'd be regenerating under the latest firmware or using diceware to BYOE.

This is a non issue, IMHO. Jade adapted #Bitcoin Core's approach to accumulative entropy to their IoT device, so even if one source is implemented poorly, in this case radio-entropy, it can't collapse the entire entropy pool. Jade's entropy pool would still contain camera + sensors + host inputs, so the seeds are most likely ungrindable. Radio merely adds redundancy. That being said, nostr:nprofile1qqsfy229w70e8lgtxavlz9t78k06yrel6fxyhreteafqet8kfxhhwmg2c6av2 should determine if the radio-input to their entropy pool was temporarily weak in 1.0.40, calculate the total entropy of seeds for that firmware, and issue and advisory if any action is needed on the part of end users. This is not a #Coldcard situation, AFAICT. I doubt seeds generated with 1.0.40 have insufficient entropy. If the remaining entropy sources still supply 128/256 unknown bits for 12/24 seed words respectively, the phrase is full strength. They certainly do. nostr:nevent1qqs2u9jklw6vxsd0crhdr44vzg43425hv3tl4rd80a6lthc0per3wtsppamhxue69uhkummnw3ezumt0d5pzpl8hpfzul2qha25p8wd63gm46ufax95lfgnl8h9v84y3zt0k05m7qy6jwv

No-Radio docs themselves say the CRNG “has reduced entropy” without radio and that bootloader_random_enable() is the mitigation. That is an API-trust claim, not a published entropy bound. Official No-Radio / reduced-entropy wording: https://help.blockstream.com/blockstream-jade/faqs/how-does-jade-generate-my-recovery-phrase Same claim in the 2022 tech overview: https://blog.blockstream.com/blockstream-jade-tech-overview-part-1/

Grok had some good insights: The rate mismatch you describe is real. Espressif documents `bootloader_random_enable()` + `esp_fill_random()` as valid true-RNG when RF is off, but `esp_random()`’s wait (`APB_CYCLE_WAIT_NUM = 16` ≈ 0.2 µs / ~5 MHz) is sized for the **RF / high-speed ADC** path. The TRM’s SAR-only max-entropy rate is ≤500 kHz (~2 µs per 32-bit read). Bootloader `bootloader_fill_random()` is much more conservative (“~1 bit per 40 APB cycles”). **v1.0.40** did exactly: `bootloader_random_enable(); esp_fill_random(entropy_state, 32); bootloader_random_disable();` **v1.0.41** (commit `e850c3b`) replaced that with eight `esp_random()` reads + 1 ms `vTaskDelay`. Comment: HW RNG state is 32 bits; 1 ms gives ~50× more refeed time than `esp_fill_random` and adds scheduler jitter. Commit text: change is **not** an admission that prior entropy was weak. ### Answers 1. **No public measurement.** Blockstream has not published a min-entropy estimate for `esp_fill_random(32)` on Classic ESP32 + SAR-only (`bootloader_random_enable`, RF off). Blog only says “multiple analyses confirmed robustness.” 2. **No evidence they applied the 500 kHz SAR cap to the 1.0.40 fill.** That fill used `esp_fill_random` → `esp_random` at the 16-APB-cycle cadence. 3. **No published lower bound** on min-entropy of that 256-bit `entropy_state`. 4. **Stated as defense-in-depth** (refeed time + jitter), not as a fix for a known break. Practically it also removes SAR refresh-rate uncertainty: 1 ms ≫ 2 µs TRM SAR interval. 5. **Not proven from the HWRNG dump alone; Blockstream treats the full pipeline as 128-bit.** A 12-word phrase is not `entropy_state` raw. After init, Jade mixes sensors, camera frames (Classic still has a camera on No-Radio), cycle-counter jitter, `strengthen()` time, host `add_entropy`, then SHA512-splits like Bitcoin Core. Isolated SAR-rate 32-byte dump is the under-specified piece; the seed path is not that dump. No-Radio docs themselves say the CRNG “has reduced entropy” without radio and that `bootloader_random_enable()` is the mitigation. That is an API-trust claim, not a published entropy bound.

Client agnostic link. nostr:naddr1qvzqqqr4gupzptwpf7366kgg2mwchqypt5m87lq7vu666q8anz5x6qp0h60m2d0pqyvhwumn8ghj7enpdenxzun9wvhxummnw3erztnrdaksqfryxs6rqwpnv33z6dphv5mz6dpjxscj6wtyvy6z6vnxxdnrzepjv93nvwpcv0qfh8

Yes. Fruit does not produce a new nature, but a new nature does produce fruit. Christians need simply focus on the ordinary means of grace. Fruit will come with the seasons.

Salvation is by faith alone because God alone is glorified when men are saved by no power of their own. Works, the obedience of the saints, sanctify them as a consequence of magnifying God's reputation. God is the gospel. #ToChristAlone

No amount of hate for "bad people" will justify you before just and perfect Creator. Have you ever lied? Lusted? Hated? Cursed? Unless you trust in Jesus alone... you will go to the same hell as the "bad people" you judge. #ToChristAlone nostr:nevent1qqsx2nmtz66udgvq3m8yny98z0ssnrsuqz2jvhn5jludfn6ptr6cjhcpp4mhxue69uhkummn9ekx7mqzyr70wzj9e75p064gzwum4z3ht4cn6vtf7j3870w2c02fzyklvlfhucryymp

The Lord alone is God. Turn #ToChristAlone, the Messiah. https://blossom.primal.net/2263f9f6a7d412bcebc2fe113c702e0afb9ae29f74de284af2cf0a15a4c39c00.jpg

Why I believe #Coinkite defrauded #Coldcard customers. 🤫 1. CTO authored entropy vulnerability while pretending to be an external contributor. Coinkite props up CTO alias as an external dev in comms. 2. CEO shared details with Odell that could only apply to the entropy vulnerability that had just gone out to customers. Odell then bragged about his self custody guide, implicating CEO. 3. CTO always used the ifndef guard correctly in the Coldcard firmware, literally dozens of times, but shipped a singular misuse of the function under his alias, thus allowing customer funds to be swept remotely. 4. In the same release the entropy vulnerability was distributed, the CTO had enabled the interactive debugger used to verify code changes on live Coldcard devices, which would plainly reveal that the false/pseudo Yasmarang entropy had been selected. https://blossom.primal.net/7fbf5ad8e7af0682795e0c20d15200be252922b23f92275f8447c49fc88a9de5.jpg

Nobody makes the changes Coldcard made without automating testing and the use of an interactive debugger to verify the entropy implementation. Add the use creation of an alibi with the Switck alias. I'm not naive.

Wow. "Everything you need to know about the #Coldcard disaster" fails to mention that: 1. #Coinkite founder and CTO Peter Gray authored the entropy vulnerability using an alias which he pretended was an external contributor, even carrying out public dialogs with himself via his CTO handle. 2. Then Peter integrates the vulnerability he himself wrote into the Coldcard source code under his official capacity as CTO, then proceeded to distribute it to customer devices. Is this not the MOST IMPORTANT thing people need to know about the #Coldcard disaster? Unbelievable. 🤡🤡🤡 https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=tMHgGItyI1M

Pictured: man, attacking #Bitcoin, by continuing to run Bitcoin without having paid attention to the #BIP110 pressure campaign. https://blossom.primal.net/514edfeb9416f7c4fe6707b423eed1699b0b0c0432774c62030d3f32b25c1fd3.jpg

Timeline of #Coldcard Heist. November 2012 onward Peter D. Gray creates a public Clarity.fm profile under his real name, based in Toronto. 2012–2013 Peter D. Gray and Rodolfo Novak (NVK) co-found Coinkite in Toronto. Gray becomes CTO; Novak becomes CEO. The company starts as a Bitcoin services platform and later shifts to hardware. It remains a small team of roughly five. November 7, 2013 Peter D. Gray creates his GPG key (uid “Peter D. Gray <[email protected]>”). This key later signs dozens of commits under the switck identity, including the critical libngu changes. December 2017 Coinkite announces the Coldcard hardware wallet. Pre-orders open for 2018 shipping. July 25, 2018 First Coldcard Mk1 units ship. August 2019 Peter creates the anonymous identity “switck,” named after the Matrix character Switch, and uses a still of that character as the profile picture. The name plays on “making the switch.” First post notes DEF CON is a good time to start a new identity. Later commits under this name are often single-word or extremely terse. 2019–2020 onward Bitcoin educators and influencers, including BTC Sessions, begin promoting Coldcard as one of the most secure Bitcoin hardware wallets. July 2020 Foundation Devices announces the Passport, built in part on Coldcard’s then-GPLv3 firmware. Early 2020s Ten31 (Managing Partners include Matt Odell and Marty Bent) becomes Coinkite’s sole external investor. January 8, 2021 Coldcard firmware 3.2.1 announces the license change from GPL to MIT + Commons Clause. January 5, 2021 Domain switck.com is registered via easyDNS using a Toronto-area privacy service (MyPrivacy.net, Etobicoke). The same day the switck account posts the single word “got.” January 28, 2021 Under switck, the vulnerable preprocessor guard (#ifndef MICROPY_HW_ENABLE_RNG) is committed to libngu (f19de05). This fails to force the hardware TRNG when the macro is set to zero. The library is co-maintained with scgbckbone (later linked to Andrej Virgovic). March 1, 2021 Under doc-hex, the commit “First pass w/ libNgU” (b18723dd) replaces remaining Trezor-derived GPL crypto and BIP-39 code with libngu (submodule from switck/libngu). Seed generation switches from the hardware path (ckcc.rng_bytes) to ngu.random.bytes(). This is the point real hardware entropy is replaced by the weak software PRNG. Coinkite release notes later thank @switck for the library. March 17, 2021 Firmware v4.0.0 is released containing the new path. March 29, 2021 Firmware 4.0.1 ships. Seeds generated under this and later affected versions fall back to the software PRNG, yielding roughly 40 bits of effective entropy on Mk2/Mk3 (roughly 72 bits on later models that mixed limited secure-element data). Around April 2021 Public users begin questioning the LibNgU rewrite and the replacement of the prior crypto stack. February 2022 Peter (as DocHex) publicly states that as CTO he encourages Coinkite developers to operate under nyms, stay low-profile about their employer, and notes he may appear to author their GitHub commits. 2022 Early reports of individual Coldcard wallets being drained appear. At least one user claims that reporting the issue to Coinkite resulted in being blocked. May 2025 James O’Beirne audits the firmware, identifies the low-star, pseudonymously maintained libngu library as the RNG source, and reports doubts that the true hardware RNG is in use. He advises removing it. Coinkite replies that if something were wrong “we’d already know about it by now.” The warning is not acted on. July 30, 2026 Attackers begin draining affected wallets. An initial wave takes roughly 594 BTC (\~$38 million) from about 500 addresses in \~25 minutes. Later waves push tracked totals higher (1,000+ BTC / $70–88 million+ range). Coinkite publishes a security advisory the same day acknowledging the 2021 entropy failure. July 31, 2026 Coinkite releases fixed firmware (4.2.0 Mk3, 5.6.0 Mk4/Mk5, 1.5.0Q). Existing weak seeds remain compromised and must be migrated. Multiple reports note NVK is deleting older tweets from the 2020 period related to the license change and open-source decisions. July 31 – August 4, 2026 Researchers link switck to Peter Gray / DocHex via matching GPG signatures on dozens of libngu commits (including the January 2021 guard), the shared phone number ending in 44, the Toronto-area domain registration, the Matrix Switch avatar and name, and overlapping contribution patterns. Peter’s LinkedIn, previously public, is made private. https://blossom.primal.net/7fbf5ad8e7af0682795e0c20d15200be252922b23f92275f8447c49fc88a9de5.jpg

You're missing something. 1 of 2 - Peter created an alias named 'Switck' which authored the Coinkite exploit. nostr:nevent1qqsqqqq5ax5fgwkxkh8s5t446n2susgmg6hwa86ymy46la86jyj7kpszypj2eaq9t75zd09ts3t7ynhclwn5jz4mremdh2m24p6j55aqadx55576wxc

Stop being cute and just roll the 🎲 nostr:nevent1qqst89dgsk5n9ckxefdkmc5yqcz0spsa03t2pfadum6dwhwzqds5pxgppamhxue69uhkummnw3ezumt0d5pzpvfnhlzhhmtpcwgaf68e2wusd3l3wzwy8rv3ca0mdkhhj3ya27yadfmdpm