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003427cecaa5e6acf4197f4be2ef8250f5e59b2b9054707679703889062f288b
Why would it trigger decent, rational people?
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675b84fe75e216ab...
npub
npub1vadcfln4ugt2h9ruwsuwu5vu5am4xaka7pw6m7axy79aqyhp6u5q9knuu7pubkey (hex)
675b84fe75e216ab947c7438ee519ca7775376ddf05dadfba6278bd012e1d728nprofile
nprofile1qqsxwkuyle67y94tj378gw8w2xw2wa6nwmwlqhddlwnz0z7sztsaw2qprf58garswvaz7tmjv4kxz7fwva6kcat8w4k82tnddajs89e3yp动态 (26)
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3cf362934b2a11d854d9f92b0019daf35958f2967485a7515e3669e19eb7d636
You don't have custodial risk with Phoenix. It's entirely possible to use Lightning self custodially without needing to worry about channel management...
You don't have custodial risk with Phoenix. It's entirely possible to use Lightning self custodially without needing to worry about channel management, I've done it for years.
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Citrea, which has been live on mainnet since January, uses basically the entire BitVM stack to create ~ trustless proof of a valid withdrawal. https:...
Citrea, which has been live on mainnet since January, uses basically the entire BitVM stack to create ~ trustless proof of a valid withdrawal.
https://eprint.iacr.org/2025/776
But then it also lets N of N signers just sign off an exit unconditionally?. Section 8 of their Clementine bridge protocol paper:
"Optimistic Payout. The protocol we described above guarantees that any peg out is completed
even if all Signers are offline and all but one are malicious. However, if all Signers are honest and
online, they have some time (in Clementine, it is ≃ 1 hour) to sign an issue a user’s peg out by
posting an OptimisticPayout transaction. This transaction resembles the Payout transaction, with
only two differences: (i) it spends the output of the MoveToVault transaction, so that the funds
given to the user do not come from the Operator, and (ii) there is no OP RETURN output. If no
OptimisticPayout transaction appears on-chain within some time, the peg out request is picked
up by the Operator and the Clementine continue as described in Section 5. To enable the optimistic
payout, Signers must not erase their keys, making the protocol secure against a non-adaptive adversary."
I've spent the last half hour trying to find any discussion of this. It looks like a very bizarre decision as it seems to throw away most advantages over multisig federation control. Notice how the signing keys have to remain essentially hot.
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Archiving joinmarket-clientserver ; see "final" (almost certainly) release: https://github.com/JoinMarket-Org/joinmarket-clientserver/releases/tag/v0....
Archiving joinmarket-clientserver ; see "final" (almost certainly) release: https://github.com/JoinMarket-Org/joinmarket-clientserver/releases/tag/v0.9.12 . A couple of years back I pulled away from doing anything more on the project, hoping that it would kind of "organically" continue somehow or other, but activity was a lot less than expected (though it was actually maintained, we weren't producing releases etc. ) .. but i was also kind of vaguely "expecting" that some people might fork and/or rewrite, as rewriting could make a lot of sense; more recently, m0wer has actually done that; see https://github.com/joinmarket-ng/joinmarket-ng ; as per notes, I can't literally "recommend", not without an absolute ton of work, and even then, it's only my opinion which isn't much. But what review I *have* done has been positive. The most interesting part is finding anti-DOS and anti-fingerprinting solutions that are practical; it's very difficult, but interesting work, so if anyone is interested, I'd recommend heading over to that repo.
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651a4ee887851cd966281b3275393af96aa852b9dd8dd13b4ff80b52be2d0023
Genuinely curious; would you say the same about an increase in supply from 21 million to some extended schedule of emissions to secure mining? I'm gue...
Genuinely curious; would you say the same about an increase in supply from 21 million to some extended schedule of emissions to secure mining? I'm guessing you would.
I do find it interesting that bitcoin could ultimately be 'hoist by its own petard' in this sense. Satoshi's 'set in stone' idea was that fully permissionless *evolution of state* of a fixed protocol is possible, using large scale proof of work. But that 'fixedness' is ofc just human consensus, and if the proof of work moves to a less ... stone-y system, the security is lost.
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↳ 回复 Leo Wandersleb (npub1gm7tuvr9atc6u7q3gevjfeyfyvmrlul4y67k7u7hcxztz67ceexs078rf6)
Without reading the details of the Arbitrarium case, how does "council decided ... to award confisca...
At this point we should all take it as a given that 'anyone can do anything' - fork, propose stuff etc. I was incredibly explicit about that in the po...
At this point we should all take it as a given that 'anyone can do anything' - fork, propose stuff etc. I was incredibly explicit about that in the post you're responding to.
But like BIP110, I think the idea of freezing coins here is antithetical to what Bitcoin is designed for: permissionlessness . And so I'm advocating against it, as strongly as I can.
I think 'sponsor a quantum frenzy' is irrelevant here. No coins will be magically created. If there's a viable path to securing *your* coins before CRQC, that is enough, even if messy, even if inactive coins get reactivated down the line [1]. That's orthogonal to actively choosing to destroy Bitcoin's value proposition.
[1] A good analogy might be: someone creates a new super-powerful gold detecting machine and suddenly a bunch of dead people who buried their gold underground in remote locations get it "reclaimed". Bad for the gold price, sure, but gold owners can't do anything because there is no all powerful 'security council' to 'delete' that gold, and they are happy about it! (Maybe in the 30s the US govt kind of did that - but that's not an example to emulate!)
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To nostr:nprofile1qqs0w2xeumnsfq6cuuynpaw2vjcfwacdnzwvmp59flnp3mdfez3czpsprpmhxue69uhkummnw3ezumr0wpczuum0vd5kzmp0ksxxx2 and nostr:nprofile1qqsr6tj32z...
To nostr:nprofile1qqs0w2xeumnsfq6cuuynpaw2vjcfwacdnzwvmp59flnp3mdfez3czpsprpmhxue69uhkummnw3ezumr0wpczuum0vd5kzmp0ksxxx2 and nostr:nprofile1qqsr6tj32zrfn7v0pu4aheaytdnnc6rluepq73ndc2tdjzus34gat9qprpmhxue69uhhyetvv9ujucm4wfex2mn59en8j6f0qy88wumn8ghj7mn0wvhxcmmv9uq3jamnwvaz7tmjv4kxz7fwwdhx7un59eek7cmfv9kz70un73l and other people that are advocating for coin freezing as a possibility: the responses in this thread I think provide a really useful window on the user level perspective. It seems like more than half of the responses to this Arbitrum tweet are saying "shucks, I guess we only have bitcoin to rely on not to freeze funds", e.g. a typical response is "Cash under your mattress and bitcoin are the only truly decentralized things" or the most apposite: "Well, bitcoin has no "security council" .. and I'm happy for it". But if you keep reading the replies you'll eventually find one that says "even in bitcoin they talk about freezing funds for whatever reason. Only left is monero then?"
https://x.com/arbitrum/status/2046435443680346189?t=NN-wAuSW8rv69Yziba2R4w&s=19
I know that a decentralized system can't depend on goodwill, and everyone is always free to propose whatever the hell they want, but what things like bip361 are proposing is "let's completely destroy bitcoin" - because you're proposing replacing it with something that has a "security council". Users of bitcoin absolutely don't want that thing as the thread above illustrates, it's *the only thing that makes bitcoin valuable*. I honestly think even the discussion so far, because it has included a lot of influential devs (and not just a lot of suits who we are used to ignoring) has already damaged bitcoin's value (sorry don't mean to sound histrionic, lol, but I really do; it's a new threat vector that some of bitcoin's devs are proposing to destroy it!).
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↳ 回复 Leo Wandersleb (npub1gm7tuvr9atc6u7q3gevjfeyfyvmrlul4y67k7u7hcxztz67ceexs078rf6)
We counted lost coins as deflation. So it wasn't deflation to lose coins as they will all be found e...
but who is this "we"? I certainly never counted all coins from some specific set (patoshi or otherwise) as lost. Indeed, occasionally big spends occur...
but who is this "we"? I certainly never counted all coins from some specific set (patoshi or otherwise) as lost. Indeed, occasionally big spends occur from funds in 2009-10. But even if they didn't, that's beside the point. It's absurd to say that spending from those coins is a violation of Bitcoin's anti-inflation promise.
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↳ 回复 Leo Wandersleb (npub1gm7tuvr9atc6u7q3gevjfeyfyvmrlul4y67k7u7hcxztz67ceexs078rf6)
Freezing coins in this case is not some rulers confiscating some users' coins but all actual users r...
It's not inflation. The number of coins isn't changing.
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I think Kimi is better than Claude for complex mathematical reasoning. It's probably more or less the same basic model but they seem to have tuned it ...
I think Kimi is better than Claude for complex mathematical reasoning. It's probably more or less the same basic model but they seem to have tuned it to really investigate and reflect more carefully.
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↳ 回复 Leo Wandersleb (npub1gm7tuvr9atc6u7q3gevjfeyfyvmrlul4y67k7u7hcxztz67ceexs078rf6)
I read your post with super intelligence in mind. Quantum computing might remain the illusive fusio...
Yeah perhaps, I doubt it but it's a valid point (about fission). Super intelligent AI possibility is definitely a wild card; very new thing, hard to ...
Yeah perhaps, I doubt it but it's a valid point (about fission).
Super intelligent AI possibility is definitely a wild card; very new thing, hard to judge.
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01f0354dc90b33734823fd343c8268ed062e68c9e349c5c14483cf2af772567c
Access to communication channels could be crucial to saving your life.
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86757e2376ec3fb312a3f89a186aa8d6515e7a10d904ed6308f67ed72de04a7c
Yes. But Israel and the UAE have not totally shut down the internet.
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5a4ef0c1b023fe0ac612408ee13867e8eba501622e37a34b4a59ace556582380
Meh, that's mostly a mischaracterization I think. Bulletproofs as originally conceived was a valuable addition to the mix; it didn't have succinct ver...
Meh, that's mostly a mischaracterization I think. Bulletproofs as originally conceived was a valuable addition to the mix; it didn't have succinct verification so it couldn't *directly* compete with Groth16 and other pairing based schemes but it did have: no trusted setup and no assumptions outside of ECDLP. The other option was STARKs but the proof sizes were large. The verification scaling being bad was addressed in HALO and HALO2 with some rather clever tweaks, keeping the no-trusted-setup property while getting succinct verification. So nowadays it's a general class of algorithms see "folding schemes", "inner product arguments" and those can be flavours of zkSNARK; bulletproofs literally purely as originally written, yes, is rarely used, although perhaps occasionally still finds a use - an example is Curve Trees, which you mention. But it's also a paradigm which continues to be used in more sophisticated forms. Perhaps a confusion here is you were thinking about 'bulletproofs for confidential transactions via range proofs' (still used in Monero) as opposed to 'bulletproofs as a general ZKP system' (which was in the original paper).
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It's a pretty good heuristic for judging which side is evil in a conflict. Which side prioritizes preventing communication rather than enabling it? ...
It's a pretty good heuristic for judging which side is evil in a conflict.
Which side prioritizes preventing communication rather than enabling it?
This is why I consider my own government system evil (the UK). There are a lot of things you can argue about, but this started actualizing in the 2000s: criminalizing or semi-criminalizing speech (see e.g. "non crime hate incidents"). That was the point at which I decided the UK's governing system had become evil (and after that, rapidly despaired of any reversal, because the population did not in general reject it as such). nostr:nevent1qqsg44e6dcqv3mrk7dez4vlh2y94anpeagyj5l7lgvqe8a88t3977ccsa0h7c
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↳ 回复 sudocarlos (npub1qdsjkr46urkg6vqrr3zqhgy8l7dazc5k9hlm5jmwqg0vft7hzgtqamgfw3)
purposely misleading headline? but why? https://nostr.sudocarlos.com/c9ce01ac6a1677623ac6075ff83724b...
Not misleading. It's been known as ICE for decades in the finance world.
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↳ 回复 0d97beae... (npub1pktmatjk0l8vn3jhfuwxaasjd65kn4ye9sce3egup7k993f8fg2q5tpxa6)
But is it useful?
https://github.com/RobinLinus/sha2-ecdsa/issues/1
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Apparently Bitrefill were hacked in a pretty sophisticated way. Honestly it's kind of an advertisement for them, paradoxically: they're one of the few...
Apparently Bitrefill were hacked in a pretty sophisticated way. Honestly it's kind of an advertisement for them, paradoxically: they're one of the few long running sellers of goods and services for bitcoin that at least offer the right model: you pay a lightning invoice, anonymously, you get the thing. you might need an email or something, but that's OK. absolutely minimized risk of funds theft along the way (only exposed *very* briefly), absolutely minimized risk of leak of personal info to hackers (since you give them so little; almost nothing in fact; notice in particular that LN does a very good job of hiding the sender's origin from the receiver; not 100% perfect but exceptionally good with non custodial wallets, heck even custodial, perhaps, depending on details, though I absolutely do not recommend custodial LN, for different reasons).
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↳ 回复 Leo Wandersleb (npub1gm7tuvr9atc6u7q3gevjfeyfyvmrlul4y67k7u7hcxztz67ceexs078rf6)
Will the combined fixes introduce an actually exploitable zero-day though?
If the NSA figured out how to poison LLM responses to this type of query so as to create backdoors, that would be truly impressive.
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an interesting point about this: there's a reason bitcoin devs tried quite strenuously, and eventually succeeded several years ago, in removing all op...
an interesting point about this: there's a reason bitcoin devs tried quite strenuously, and eventually succeeded several years ago, in removing all openssl dependency from the bitcoin project. it's the nature of some of the truly awful protocols (ASN1 , X509 and etc etc) that openssl had to, or chose to support. so yes a very natural and correct reaction is "holy shit what happens when people find similar bugs in the consensus layer of bitcoin" but it's also true that it's a very controlled and very stress-tested surface area that removed stuff that was problematic. It's also true that even 1 small bug could be catastrophic. I guess we'll see!
nostr:nevent1qqsgehzm6ggqe2nszaq5xlxlmcwlqh7l62mcpr82gs2k0htuqlust4sprpmhxue69uhkummnw3ezumr0wpczuum0vd5kzmp0qgs0w2xeumnsfq6cuuynpaw2vjcfwacdnzwvmp59flnp3mdfez3czpsrqsqqqqqp7fcr3y
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↳ 回复 SatsAndSports (npub1zthq85gksjsjthv8h6rec2qeqs2mu0emrm9xknkhgw7hfl7csrnq6wxm56)
Nice! So this would need a fork to be usable on chain on bitcoin? This solves the mathematical pro...
Yes it needs a soft fork. The important thing is there's a solid theoretical basis for actually doung CISA. Experience with MuSig taught us you have t...
Yes it needs a soft fork. The important thing is there's a solid theoretical basis for actually doung CISA. Experience with MuSig taught us you have to be super careful building these algos ... the power that Schnorr's linearity gives you is a double edged sword.
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8fd10205a8f12fd403fdde8667512fed08ebf8f762439cc77cbcc61857519a86
Interesting read. It doesn't sound easy to do this across a country... but maybe I'm wrong.
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758b08e2d50465020aa3754f5c1f8e3ce34dfddfd8020328dbacdb61566ee819
Interesting. If we think of LN, we have that: not only ability to withdraw, but also ability to maintain currently held funds, passively, can be viola...
Interesting. If we think of LN, we have that: not only ability to withdraw, but also ability to maintain currently held funds, passively, can be violated even without 51% attack but merely through censorship by miners, or even pure unavailability or pricing out through fees > available balance. Hence someone put it in some pithy statement that I can't remember along the lines of "in Lightning censorship resistance is a security requirement" (meh I can't remember exactly but you get it). But then is that overlapping with a 51% attack, or not? I always thought of the latter as specifically referring to attempts to "undo" payments, so changing inclusion and/or ordering of txs. I think I'm trying to say that, with this definition, even LN doesn't count as an L2, does it?
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e21dd9d0a07e457018dc7d4e9362f2fd05045cb63f7eeefc8e8e860dd5097fcd
Good luck with that :)
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↳ 回复 Jordan S (npub1p3za04z7mv86mkjzzhfkegxe4wsvwudct5m3wajt3gfg6hjy8exslltqmk)
Grok?
Is it better than claude, chatgpt, kimi for this kind of thing? I'm talking about cryptography, let's say.
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ea4d22ee9940ccdbaea9118850f092d5baee2674ccbe8caeed7d507d3b036270
Right, understood. I think it's enough to just document the choice, though personally I think desktop wallets should always have an encryption option,...
Right, understood. I think it's enough to just document the choice, though personally I think desktop wallets should always have an encryption option, I do understand that Liana is principally targeting HW signing, right.
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